T he future of the planet appears bleak. Politicians, businesses, and citizens have failed to address the loss of biodiversity. Increases in population and higher standards of living indicate an unsustainable trajectory of resource extraction. Well-intentioned international agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) may lack sufficient force to halt human-caused degradation of the environment. Therefore, biologists should be concerned as to whether the recent Nagoya Protocol, which was hammered out after several years of negotiations and a CBD conference in October of last year (www.cbd.int/ nagoya/outcomes), will enhance the ability of scientists to contribute to research on biodiversity. The Nagoya Protocol is intended to support one of the pillars of the CBD-access to and the sharing of benefits from biodiversity.
The year 1993, when the CBD came into force, was exciting; the CBD created new mechanisms for biologists to contribute to the planet's welfare. I had high expectations that the CBD would stimulate research; promote the discovery of novel, sustainable uses of biodiversity; and enhance scientific capacity, material prosperity, and conservation in developing, biodiversityrich nations. My subsequent experience in the field of bioprospecting has convinced me that the CBD could have produced a sea change in conservation by engaging powerful constituencies that often are not concerned with conservation, including businesses, city dwellers, and governments worldwide (Joly et al. 2010) .
The CBD has promoted conservation and defended against biopiracy, but the expectation has not been met that the CBD would substantially propel biodiversity research partnerships. The stagnation over an 18-year period has been frustrating. The core problems are that for fear of biopiracy, developing countries have inhibited biodiversity research, and developed nations, for fear of financial and legal hurdles, have failed to promote studies on the uses of biodiversity. The expected increase in medical discoveries derived from CBD-promoted bioprospecting in developing countries has not materialized. Similarly, although international cooperation undoubtedly has grown, the CBD does not nurture international biodiversity research and the training of biologists from developing countries. Although this situation is clearly opposed to the CBD and to shared national interests, little capacity to move events in a more positive direction has emerged. Further delay in realizing the scientific objectives of the CBD is a serious concern.
In 1992, with the CBD goals in mind, my colleagues and I initiated a bioprospecting project in Panama. Today, the project is part of the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBG) program, supported by the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the US Department of Agriculture (www.icbg.org/pub/groups.php); it has acquired a group of excellent collaborators, made significant discoveries, and provided immediate benefits to Panama in terms of training, research opportunities, and infrastructure (Kursar et al. 2006) . ICBG research projects in eight other biodiverse countries on the sustainable uses of biodiversity (bioprospecting) bridges scientific training, conservation, and economic development (Ambrus 2007, Dettenhofer and Hampl 2009 The ICBGs demonstrate how to link research on and access to biodiversity with benefits that accrue immediately (i.e., without waiting for royalties) to the participants as well as to the world's biodiversity and to human health, expressly as envisaged by the CBD.
Bioprospecting, although only one possible use of biodiversity, highlights why the issues of access to and benefit sharing in biodiversity-based research are highly charged: Many discoveries based on traditional knowledge or biotic collections have resulted in profitable products for developed-country companies without benefits for the source countries. We must make certain this does not happen again, and looking to the future, we must answer questions about why the CBD has not unfolded as scientists had anticipated and whether the Nagoya Protocol will be an improvement. Although the Nagoya Protocol is a step in the right direction, we probably will need more effective ways of creating partnerships that are win-win for all parties. But how can we promote cooperation? Experience from the ICBG suggests that three complementary issues must be resolved: legal instruments for cooperation, transparency, and accountability.
Legal instruments for cooperation
Several of the protocol's provisionswhich are more specific than those in the CBD-may speed the legal arrangements needed for the scientific study of biodiversity, which provide for "fair and nonarbitrary rules" and "a clear and transparent decision." The legal regime should encourage all types of research, because the distinctions between commercial, applied academic (e.g., natural products chemistry, Viewpoint biomimetics), and basic research are inherently blurry, and seemingly basic research can lead to commercial outcomes. Because discoveries that may lead to new technologies are rarefew enter the development pipeline and even fewer result in commercial products-the legal framework must promote early-stage research. All initial agreements on access and benefits should be simple, generic, and easily executed. To protect the interests of biodiverse source nations, the initial agreement must state that should commercialization become likely, a new agreement will be negotiated that focuses on benefits. A win-win situation would be one in which mutually beneficial collaborative research is initiated without delay under a simple but effective legal instrument. The protocol encourages the parties to use "model contractual clauses" and, at several points, refers to "changes of intent" in access agreements. Although the Nagoya Protocol might support the legal mechanism that I have outlined, its effective application certainly will require added measures.
Transparency
The simplest method for advancing large-scale cooperation is transparency. Monitoring who bears costs and who enjoys benefits provides incentives for good behavior and can achieve voluntary cooperation. Despite good intentions, the "clearinghouse," an entity that was established by the CBD in 1993 for collecting and disseminating information, has not been effective. The Nagoya Protocol establishes an access-and benefit-sharing clearinghouse; its primary function is sharing information on policies and permits.
How can a clearinghouse promote the study of biodiversity? Even though the chances of research generating royalties are slim and long term, developed nations can contribute substantial immediate and guaranteed benefits to developing countries in terms of capacity building, technology transfer, and financial support for research.
Although these receive less mention in the Nagoya Protocol than in the CBD, an annex to the protocol provides a thoughtful list of such benefits. The United States, through the ICBG program, has contributed considerably to training and technology transfer, whereas other developed nations appear to have contributed minimally or not at all. But because the clearinghouse mechanism does not require each developed nation to report its contributions, the benefits derived from monitoring are not realized. Similarly, the developing countries do not report on the provision of access to biodiversity; their shortcoming is that they often restrict access of foreign and national researchers (Brazilian Chemical Society, www.sbq.org.br/noticias_ detalhes.php?idnoticia=573) . Although the CBD and Nagoya clearinghouses are excellent ideas, the United Nations (UN) has to make them work.
Accountability
Experience shows that transparency alone does not constitute effective governance; the imperfect implementation of the CBD and other environmental regimes is due to weak governance. Specifically, the CBD and Nagoya Protocol lack contractual obligations; both are declaratory in nature and the mechanism for fulfilling these agreements is voluntary cooperation. Thus, even over a period of nearly two decades, these agreements have done little to promote international scientific cooperation. The recent UN record on environmental governance is not encouraging; some critical issues have taken 10 or more years to resolve, and we do not have the luxury of decades. More substantive initiatives that provide incentives for good behavior, sanctions for bad behavior, and that enforce norms may be required (Esty and Ivanova 2003, Berruga and Maurer 2006) . Perhaps, as many have suggested, to manage the global commons the UN must create an environmental security council with, for example, two-or three-dozen countries, comprising equal numbers of developing and developed nations.
The CBD provides a universal vision for the security of biodiversity, but words alone do not solve problems. The beauty and fascination of nature are not enough to save it. To realize the aggregate value of biodiversity and efficiently conserve it, we must know it, investigate it, and have access to it. Many of us believe that capturing the value of biodiversity and linking this to conservation at a massive scale will create a major milestone in environmental protection. Even though the last 18 years has seen scientific progress inhibited, for the near future we must work with the CBD, Nagoya Protocol, and related agreements. Nevertheless, should there be no substantial improvement in international environmental governance, I cannot help but wonder if the same issues will be pending 18 years hence.
